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Risk Analysis and Management of Diving Operations: Assessing Human Factors
Abstract
Current technological advancements in diving systems have been paramount to
increasing the depth and duration of commercial and military diving operations. Even
with such advances and the use of proven engineered diving systems, as humans continue
to strive for deeper and longer dives, significant risk to all personnel is inherent.
Minimization and mitigation of such risk is vital to meet the need for continued use of
manned-diving systems to perform specific underwater tasks.
This paper will focus on developing mixed qualitative and quantitative risk
analysis tools using current human and organizational factors (HOF) research and
database software that can be applied to diving operations. Surprisingly, assessment,
evaluation, and management of risks associated with diving operations are rarely
performed even in today's high-tech environment. Since a major component of the
diving operation is the human and organizational element, there should be adequate
safety management systems in place to assess their likelihood of failure. Assessment and
monitoring are vital to ensure safe procedures in diving operations and require effective
operator/diver involvement and training.
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1.0 Introduction
The combination of a hazardous environment and modern technology can often
magnify the effects and consequences of performing simple tasks. This is the case when
performing work in an austere, almost alien, underwater environment while using
"leading-edge" technological diving systems. Underwater work, by its nature, can
therefore be considered as inherently risky business. Unfortunately, there is still a need
for manned-diving systems to perform specific tasks that remotely operated vehicles
(ROV) and submersibles are unable to perform. As such, human and organizational
factors (HOF) and the man-machine interface must be considered when evaluating the
risks associated with a diving operation.
The human element, can be considered "the limiting and the enabling factor in
offshore operations, depending on one's perspective, and depending on the availability of
tools to support and maximize performance" [Kirwan, 1997]. It is this double-edged
sword that has apparently kept manned-diving systems as the tool of choice for
performing complex underwater work and any tasks requiring manual-dexterity (e.g.
underwater welding, concrete placement, and pipeline repair). Like any other component
in a system, the human element is complex and interacts with the other system
components with significant uncertainty.
This paper will discuss HOF applied to diving systems and operations, and
proceed with the development of a fully integrated diving safety management and
c€
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assessment system that draws upon recent developments in HOF assessment and
incorporates incident/accident-reporting legislation. The results will hopefully help
offshore diving operators, both military and commercial, in their quest to minimize and
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2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Risk Assessment, Evaluation, and Management
Risk assessment and management techniques have been successfully applied in
the fields of aerospace, nuclear and chemical engineering for the last two decades. In the
aftermath of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA formally established
the Safety, Reliability, and, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance Office (SRM&QA)
to specifically implement risk management programs. Risk management is defined as a
"comprehensive process for dealing with risk in a decision-making framework to provide
for the identification and evaluation of significant risks, and their rational acceptance or
optimal mitigation" [Philipson and Buchbinder, 1997].
Risk assessment and management has two important steps. The first part is the
determination of the risks associated with the system and the second part involves
determination of acceptability of those risks [Bea, 1998]. "In safety, risk is the product of
the frequency of an unwanted event and the consequences of that unwanted event"
[Harrison, 1997]. Harrison [1997] further outlined the complete process of risk
management for marine systems in the following eight steps:
1. Define the activity and its scope (what is at risk?);
2. Identification of hazards and risks;
3. Assess the risk;
I<
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4. Control the risk (as appropriate by elimination or reduction);
5. Monitor and review (follow the success);
6. Contingency plans (actions to take in the event of unwanted change);
7. Defining management responsibilities;
8. Emergency preparedness (real-time crisis management).
This process of risk management has been adapted and applied to diving systems
and operations as shown in Figure 1 on the following page [Monioudis and
Mavromatakis, 1997]. Key elements in this process are the frequency of event's database
and the final step, initiation of management change. These steps are critical to
continuous improvement of the system and in the case of diving operations are areas that
could use significant improvement. Development of this database management system
drawing from recent methods in HOF studies and integrating the required safety reporting
legislation is paramount to continued use of manned-diving operations.
(c
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Figure 1: Risk Management Process [adapted from Monioudis and Mavromatakis,
1997]
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As a basis for determining the cost benefit, Table 1 provides a database for
comparison of the costs and limitations of the various systems associated with diving
operations [Offshore, 1983], [Navy Diving Manual, 1993].
Category Working Depth
(ft)
Capital Investment Daily Rate (approx.)
SCUBA Diving (Air) 0-190 Low Low
Surface Supply Diving 0-190 Low Low
(Air or Heliox)
Bounce Diving 190-300 $300,000 $10,000
(2-diver system)
Bounce Diving 190-300 $600,000 $13,000
(4-diver system)
Saturation Diving 190-1000 $1-5 million $16,000
(4-diver system)
Saturation Diving 190-1000 $1-5 million $20,000
(4-diver system)
One-Atmosphere 2,000 $600,000 $2,000
(Jim, Wasp)
Table 1: Manned Diving Limitations and Costs
2.2 Reliability and Risk Analysis
Risk analysis involves the evaluation of the sources, effects, and consequences of
risks [Bea, 1994]. It can be qualitative and/or quantitative or a mixture of the two. The
reliability of a system (P s) is the probability that the system will perform successfully,
while the probability of failure (P t) is the likelihood that the system will fail given by
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In this paper, failure of a diving system will be defined as the likelihood of injury
to a diver. Although most occupational databases are concerned with the fatality rates, an
effective safety management database for the diving industry should account for all
incidents, accidents, near misses, and initiating events leading up to the incident.
2. 2. 1 Qualitative Risk Analysis
A qualitative risk analysis is a subjective evaluation of the system based on
previous accidents and determination of the most common failure modes, known as a
coarse analysis. Once the failure modes are determined a detailed qualitative analysis can
be performed to estimate the consequences and likelihood of the failure modes. The
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a common method for this type of
assessment [Aven, 1992]. Most diving safety management systems only make use of this
type of risk analysis, often referred to as an activity hazard analysis.
With the Lord Cullen inquiry report into the Piper Alpha offshore disaster, all
offshore operators are recommended to describe their Safety Management Systems as
part of a "Safety Case" for installations [UK DOE, 1990]. The report states that the
Safety Management System should be adequate to ensure safe operation of the
installation and it's equipment and based on the principles of a quality management
system. An additional requirement of the report is auditing and monitoring of the
contractor's safety programs [Wood, 1991]. According to Wood [1991], this level of
analysis and proactive safety management along with a Diving Procedures Manual has
tI-
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contributed to a reduction of accidents and incidents in the North Sea by 78% since 1989.
Projects implementing this approach had overall incident rates lower than those that
simply used operator requirements.
Intolerable risk level ^ 7 Risk can not be justified
save in extraordinary
circumstances
Tolerable only if risk reduction
The ALARP or \ / is impracticable or if penalties
Tolerability region \ / are grossly disproportionate
Tolerable if penalties of reduction
would exceed the improvement
Negligible risk level \ / No need for detailed
Analysis to demonstrate
ALARP
Figure 2: The ALARP Principle [from Lamb and Rudgley, 1997]
The objective and cornerstone of such a qualitative hazard analysis is to ensure
that all significant hazards are identified and that the level of risk for each is determined
to be "As Low as Reasonably Practicable". This principle, known as ALARP, is shown
in Figure 2 [Lamb and Rudgley, 1997]. Determination of what is considered ALARP is
subject to past acceptable risk criteria and may not be adequate for today's standards.
To better address this ALARP principle and assist in the detailed qualitative risk
assessment of the various diving failure modes, a Risk Assessment Code (RAC) matrix
adopted from the U.S. Navy [OPNAVINST 3500]. From this matrix, one can quickly
estimate and determine the high consequence with moderate to low probability hazards
which are of considerable concern and likely to require a more in-depth assessment [Bea,
c<
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1998]. Table 2 shows the RAC matrix, which is a combination of the hazard severity
and the loss probability.
RAC Probability
A B C D
Hazard
Severity
I - Diver Fatality
II - Severe Injury




2 3 4 5
3 4 5 5
Loss Probability:
A - Likely to occur frequently (1E-1)
B - Probably will occur or expected to occur several times (1E-2)
C - May occur or can be reasonably expected to (1E-3)








Table 2: Risk Assessment Code (RAC)
2. 2.2 Quantitative Risk Analysis
Once the critical failure modes have been determined, a quantitative or objective
analysis of the diving system can be performed. This approach generally makes use of
numerical variables and probabilistic models, and traditionally known as probabilistic
risk analysis (PRA) or quantified risk analysis (QRA) using a Fault Tree Analysis or
Event Tree Analysis [Bea, 1998]. This type of analysis has been developed in-depth for
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2.2.3 Mixed Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis
The third approach to risk analysis, referred to as a mixed qualitative and
quantitative analysis, can best be described as a process where "linguistic variables are
translated to numerical variables" [Bea, 1998] as shown by Figure 3 [Bea, 1996].
Without sufficient and reliable human error databases, this approach offers the best
method to assess the influence of human and organizational factors.






7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Figure 3: Mixed Qualitative & Quantitative Grading Analysis [from Bea, 1996]
2.3 Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Reliability
Since the diving system and operation are primarily a man-machine interface, it is
critical to understand the human component of the system to determine the overall system
reliability. Extensive research has been conducted on identification of the causes of
marine related accidents. According to most experts, human and organizational factors
(HOF) are the cause of approximately 80% of offshore and marine accidents. Det Norske
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were related to human unreliability and only 23% were related to technical causes [ISM
Code Workshop, 1997].
In this paper, human reliability is defined as the probability of accomplishing a
job or task successfully while human error is the failure to carry out a specified task that
could lead to an accident [Gertman and Blackman, 1993]. To assist in the estimation and
quantification ofhuman error, Swain and Guttman [1983] developed generic human error
rates from experiment and simulation in the operations of nuclear power plants as shown
in Figure 4. In addition to these human error rates, Dougherty and Frangola [1988]
conducted further experiments and simulations to develop performance shapingfactors






























New or rarely performed task
Extreme stress, very little time
Severe distractions & impairments
Highly complex task
Considerable stress, little time
Moderate distractions & impairments
Complex or unfamiliar task
Moderate stress, moderate time
Little distractions & impairments
Difficult but familiar task
Little stress, sufficient time
Very little distractions or impairments
Simple, frequent, skilled task
No stress, no time limits
No distractions or impairments














5 Lack of exercise 1.8
Time shortage 11 Misperception of risk 4 Unreliable instruments 1.6
Low signal to noise
ratio












3 Lack of progress
tracking
1.4
Design model mismatch 8 Inadequate checking 3 Limited physical
capabilities
1.4
Irreversible action 8 Objectives conflicts 3 Emotional stress 1.3
Information overload 6 Limited diversity 2.5 Sleep cycle disruption 1.2
Technique unlearning 6 Educational mismatch 2
Knowledge transfer 5.5 Dangerous incentives 2
Table 3: Performance Shaping Factors
According to Gertman and Blackman [1993], "hardware failure and human failure
equals system failure", but "there is a synergy between the two where human actions can
either aid or impede recovery". "Optimizing the human-machine interface" can often
reduce risk. Therefore, to properly assess and evaluate the risks associated with diving
systems and operations, the author will attempt to integrate human reliability analysis
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Bea [1994] identified the components and interfaces that can lead to human errors
as shown in Figure 5. Individual operators can be influenced to make errors by their
organization, procedures (formal and informal), systems and hardware, and the
environment. In addition, Bea [1994] classified the specific malfunctions related to the
individual and organization. Individual malfunctions consisted of:
1) Communications;
2) Slips (accidental lapses);
3) Violations (infringement, transgression);
4) Ignorance (unawareness, unlearned);
5) Planning and preparation (program, procedures, readiness);
6) Selection and training (suited, education, practiced);
7) Limitations and impairments (fatigue, stressed, diminished senses); and
8) Mistakes (cognitive errors).




2) Culture (goals, incentives, values, trust);
3) Violations (infringement, transgression);
4) Ignorance (unawareness, unlearned);
5) Planning and preparation (program, procedures, readiness);
6) Structure and organization (team integrity, interdependence);
7) Monitoring and controlling (awareness, correction); and
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Calculation of human and organizational error (HOE) can be done by the use of
Equations (2) and (3), the probability of failure of the system to develop quality attribute
(i), P(Fsi), where (I) represents intrinsic causes (such as extreme environmental
conditions and other similar inherent, natural, or professional uncertainties) and (E)
represents extrinsic causes due to HOE [Bea, 1998].
P(Fsi) = P(FSU I ESi) P(Esi) + P(Fsu I ESl) P(ESl) + P(FSiE / ESi) P(ESl) (2)
Where,
P(Esi) = 1 - P(Est) = probability ofno HOE (3)
And, P (A | B) represents the probability of occurrence ofA conditional on the
occurrence of B.
For diving operations, the quality attribute (i) is Safety, and the primary concern
and dominant factor of the equation is the probability ofHOE due to extrinsic causes
P(Fs,ej) during the operation (j=3) phase. The diving operation can be further broken
down into various phases, each of which P(Fs,Ejk) can be influenced by the eight types of
human and organizational malfunctions given previously, resulting in P(FsjEjkm)-
The HOE can be reduced by proper quality control and quality assurance
(QC/QA), provided by the dive buddy, standby diver or surface support. Assuming
independent detection and correction activities, P(FSiEjkm) can be replaced by Equation
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P(UEm) = P(Em)[l - P(Dm)P(Cm)J (4)
The study of human and organizational factors seeks to improve safety through
reduction of the frequency of human errors and mitigating the consequences of human
errors when they occur. During an offshore diving operation, the results of human or
organizational errors can lead to "catastrophic consequences" [Blumenberg, 1996]. To
minimize these consequences, a method of assessment should be adopted that adequately
evaluates the likelihood of failures and ultimately determines the risk associated with all
components of the system.
2.3.1 A viation HOF Checklists
The study of "Human Factors" involves an application of scientific methods and
technology to solve human performance problems. It represents an attempt to "optimize
the performance of individuals in systems operation, maintenance, and supervisory
control of complex environments exemplified by today's sophisticated aircraft and
support equipment and facilities" [Ciavarelli, 1997]. From a systems point of view,
performance and reliability can be improved by focusing on reduction of human error.
This can be done by concentrating efforts to insure that design of equipment and
procedures are adequate, and that personnel selected for the task have the required
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To better understand the influence ofHOF in man-machine systems, various HOF
checklists for the aviation community have been developed and can be reviewed in the
annual proceedings of the Human Factors Society and Aviation Psychology Symposia,
and International Society of Accident Investigators. These checklists provide a quick,
and to a large degree, a valid and adequate assessment method for identifying areas to
improve a system's reliability. Most notably, Ciavarelli [1997] of the Naval Postgraduate
School has developed a more accurate and "user-friendly" human factors checklist for
aviation.
The approach used in developing this form was based on analyzing hundreds of
aviation accidents and then "classifying particular human errors, or error prone
conditions, under the rubric of specific human performance categories (Sensory-
Perceptual, Medical-Physiological. Knowledge-Skill, Personality-Safety Attitude,
Decision-Judgement, Crew Communication-Coordination, System Design, and
Organizational-Supervisory)" [Ciavarelli, 1997]. A portion of the resulting Human
Factors Checklist from the Naval Aviation Safety School, Naval Postgraduate School is
provided as Appendix A. The complete version of this checklist can be obtained from the
following World Wide Web address: http://web.nps.navy.mil/~avsafety/pub/hfchklst.htm.
Although these HOF checklists are a step in the right direction to enhance safety,
they are still deficient in capturing qualitatively and quantitatively the risk or uncertainty
associated with systems involving HOF. The checklists are usually Yes/No questions
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importance of each checklist item, nor do they take into account the context in which the
system is being used [Kirwin, 1998].
2. 3.2 Diving HOF Checklist
Although human factors analysis may be relatively straightforward under normal
working conditions, in an underwater environment of "high density, low temperatures,
increased turbidity, reduced visibility, currents, and potential marine hazards, the
evaluation becomes far more challenging" [Crosson, 1993]. Design, development, and
operation of diving systems must consider all of these factors. In addition, consideration
must be given to the diver's physiological requirements, efficient performance of the
system in all scenarios, and adequate safety and comfort for the divers.
According to most diving accident statistics [Naval Safety Center, 1996 and Diver
Alert Network, 1996], the majority of accidents occur during the diving operations phase.
To assist with safety assessment during this phase, Blumenberg [1996] developed a dive
team HOF checklist (see Appendix B). The dive team human factors checklist is
intended for "observations of real-time operations and facilitation of recording targeted
behaviors" [Blumenberg, 1996]. The checklist provides a quick and user- friendly
assessment form for analyzing HOF in real-time diving operations utilizing a 1.0 (poor)
to 4.0 (outstanding) scoring system. Like the aviation HOF checklist, it is a step in the
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Blumenberg [1996] used the dive team HOF checklist as a post-accident
investigation of a diving fatality of an underwater construction worker assigned to the
U.S. Navy. The results showed where human factors acted as contributing and
compounding events and later lead to the eventual fatal accident. Although the
assessment was limited by witness accounts instead of actual observations, it revealed
that HOF factors received a range of scores from poor (performance significantly below
expectations) to standard (demonstrated behavior promotes and maintains team
effectiveness). No category received the high score of 4 which equates to an outstanding
(performance represents exceptional skill in the application of specific behaviors, and
serves as a model for teamwork).
Table 4 below shows the summary of scores for this accident.
Pre-Dive Dive Post-Dive
Team communication & coordination 2.0 N/A N/A
Situational awareness & decision making 1.8 2.0 2.0
Auditing N/A 1.0 N/A
Resources 2.7 2.7 2.5
Operational procedures 3.0 3.0 3.0
Training N/A 2.0 N/A
Individual fitness of diver 2.1 2.0 2.0
Special situations 2.0 2.0 3.0
Overall observation N/A N/A N/A
Table 4: Score Summary from Dive Team HOF Checklist [Blumenberg, 1996]
18
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From this quick assessment, a safety/dive supervisor could have quickly
determined that the areas of concern noted with a score of 1 or 2 (e.g. communications,
auditing, decision-making, training, fitness, and special situations) should have been
analyzed in more depth and warranted further examination. In this situation, the diving
operation would have been ceased due to its overall low scoring equating to significantly
high risk for the divers.
19
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3.0 Current Diving Safety Management
3. 1. 1 Military and Government Diving Safety Management
Within most military and government-sponsored diving organizations, safety is
managed through various planning and safety checklists and a simplified activity risk
analysis. The safety and planning checklist used by the U.S. Navy consists of the
following detailed sections [U.S. Navy Diving Manual, 1993]:
a) Analyze the mission for safety,
b) Identify and analyze potential hazards,
c) Select equipment, personnel, and emergency procedures, and
d) Establish safe diving operational procedures.
In addition, there are various operations checklists for the different types of diving
systems selected, such as a surface-supplied diving operation checklist. The activity risk
analysis usually only involves identification of potential hazards (again through a simple
checklist) and steps to mitigate those hazards. It does not however provide adequate in-
depth analysis of the likelihood of events and the consequences of those events, nor does
it analyze the impact of human and organizational factors (HOF). It is this area of
concern that should be qualitatively and quantitatively analyzed through a database
managed safety information system.
20
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The U.S. Navy also uses a relatively simple reactive approach to diving safety
that requires the submission of an accident/incident report to the Naval Safety Center.
According to the U.S. Navy Diving Manual [1993], an accident is "an unexpected event,
which culminates in loss of or serious damage to equipment or injury to personnel". An
incident is "an unexpected event which degrade safety and increases the probability of an
accident. The accident/incident information sheet is included as Appendix C for
reference purposes. It provides a starting point for development of a detailed assessment
form, which will account for HOF and near-mishaps.
Although the Naval Safety Center diving statistics [1996] show the number of
diving accidents/incidents as low compared to the total number of dives conducted each
year, there is no database managed system in-place which accurately tracks the incident
rates. Additionally, there is a significant deficiency with current safety management
systems since they due not adequately assess the initiating, propagating, or contributing
HOF events leading to the incident.
3.1.2 Commercial Diving Safety Management
In the commercial industry, the primary means of managing diving safety,
whether inshore or offshore, is through the Association of Diving Contractors' (ADC)
"Consensus Standards for Commercial Diving Operations". It provides a standard of
safe practices and procedures for diving operations to complement applicable
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personnel requirements, operations procedures, equipment and systems, and accident
reporting [ADC, 1992]. It does not however provide any specific guidelines or
systematic procedures for managing and assessing safety on a day-to-day basis.
The most significant part of the ADC Consensus Standard, which is applicable to
developing a diving safety management system, relates to accident reporting. Although
this is a reactive approach to safety management, it is a section that can be further
developed and used during a follow-up phase to create a HOF error database. Incident
rates are determined by Equation (5) and reported to Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) via the ADC Standard Incident Data Reporting Form (see
Appendix D).
r . , n # ofIncidents x 200,000
Incident Rate =— (5)Hours worked K '
This incident rate represents the total number of incidents equated to one hundred
employees working forty hours per week for a fifty-week year. The incident rate is
calculated for Lost Time Accidents (LTA) and Total Reportable Incidents. A LTA is a
work-related accident or illness that results in the worker being unable to perform any
work for 24 hours or more after the incident. A reportable incident is usually a work-
related accident or illness that requires treatment by a Licensed Physician [ADC, 1992].
Type I decompression sickness (DCS-I: pain only bends), where offshore treatment is
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bends) is reportable if shore hyperbaric treatment occurs. This incident rate will be
included in the proposed Diving Safety Management System discussed later.
Since the beginning of 1991, a Diving Safety Management System has been in
successful use by a major North Sea offshore operator [Wood, 1991]. The system was
developed in response to diving accident statistics published by the United Kingdom
Department of Energy. The statistics revealed that between 1976 to 1988 diving activity
produced an average of 13% of the serious injuries that occurred offshore. The system
sets out criteria for safe management of diving operations in proven, formal and
consistent management control systems. The complete system has the following
objectives:
1) To enable the identification and use of competent and safe contractors.
2) To encourage contractors to develop safety management systems.
3) To reduce the potential for accidents before offshore work commences.
4) To assist in the development of safe and cost effective diving safety policies
and procedures.
5) To encourage the use of formal hazard evaluation systems.
6) To ensure that all criteria, standards, guidelines, and legislation are considered
where applicable.
7) To provide clear and concise responsibilities, objectives, and policies for all
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The most significant part of the diving safety management system outlined by
Wood [1991] is the contractor safety evaluations. There are two types of evaluations that
are carried out, 1) contractor safety evaluation of documented safety policies and
effectiveness and 2), safety performance evaluation of the actual job safety performance.
The evaluations are conducted through a mixed qualitative/quantitative assessment where
elements of safety are given a score from to 10. Although this system is an audit for
determining whether or not a contractor should be put on a bidder list, it provides a
framework for assessments and inspections that can be carried out by the individual
contractors. It is by far the first step toward a proactive assessment system to minimize
risk in the offshore diving industry.
After work is completed, the contractors are evaluated on the following items and
disciplines:
1) Hazard control: housekeeping, certification, general hazard control,
maintenance of plant and equipment, permit to dive procedures.
2) Fire control and industrial hygiene: chemical hazard control, flammable
materials and equipment control, fire control measures, chamber waste and
trash control.
3) Supervisory and safety participation: supervisor safety training, safety
instruction of new employees, safety meetings, safety audits and inspections,
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3.2 A Mixed Qualitative and Quantitative Assessment of HOF
The complimentary approach to risk analysis discussed earlier, a mixed
qualitative and quantitative analysis, can best be described as a process where "linguistic
variables are translated to numerical variables" [Bea, 1998] as shown in Figure 3 [Hee
and Bea, 1997]. Without sufficient and reliable human error databases, this approach
offers the best method to assess the influence ofhuman and organizational factors in the
offshore industry.
Assessment ofHOF in the entire life cycle of the diving system and operation is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the mixed qualitative/quantitative assessment
method discussed will be applied to system safety concerns during the operations phase
as shown in Figure 6. Extrinsic causes have been related to 80% of marine accidents and








Figure 6: Life-Cycle Evaluation of HOF in Diving Operations
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The diving statistics indicate that decompression sickness (DCS) and arterial gas
embolism (A.G.E.) are the greatest concerns and the result of most incidents. Both of
these incidents occur in the ascent and decompression phases of the diving operation
shown in Figure 7. In addition, the statistics also indicate that the loss of air supply
should also be focused on, which again would usually occur during ascent and










Figure 7: Diving Operation
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4.0 Diving Systems/Operations
A diving system represents the entire plant and equipment necessary to conduct
the diving operation. In accordance with International Maritime Organization (IMO)
[Code of Safety for Diving Systems, 1995], these diving systems should be "designed to
minimize human error and be constructed so that failure of any single component
(determined, if necessary, by an appropriate risk assessment) should not lead to a
dangerous situation". A brief synopsis and simplified system diagrams of the primary
diving systems used by commercial and military diving organizations are provided to
assist in the risk assessment.
4.1 Self-contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus (SCUBA)
The self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) diving system is the
most common system in use. A system diagram is shown in Figure 8. SCUBA, although
readily available and easy to use, has significant areas for safety concern.
1) Lack of communications (except for hand signals),
2) Use of a buoyancy compensator (BC),
3) Lack of air source redundancy unless using an emergency breathing system
(EBS) or bailout,
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Surface Support



















Figure 8: SCUBA System Diagram
4.2 Surface-Supplied Operations
The surface-supplied diving-system is widely used by commercial and military
diving teams at depths up to 190 feet salt water (fsw). It offers significant advantages
over SCUBA including increased air quantity, communications, and redundancy of air
sources as shown in Figure 9. Areas of safety concern include 1) possibility of
entanglement of umbilical, and 2) decompression concerns.
28
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Surface Support












Figure 9: Surface-Supplied Diving System Diagram
4.3 Saturation Diving Operations
By far the most complex diving-system in use (see Figure 10), saturation diving
offers the greatest depths and time on bottom (with the same decompression time once
saturated). The operation basically consists of a deck decompression chamber (DDC) at
the surface, a personnel transfer chamber (PTC) or bell for transit to and from project
site, and either SCUBA or helmet dive systems from the PTC [Goodfellow, 1977].
Safety concerns are numerous for this type of system, but many feel it is safer than
surface supply due to the crew redundancy, and component redundancies [Oman, 1994].
Some additional risks are associated with the use of pressure vessels (e.g. fires,
explosions), and excursion diving (above and below) the PTC.
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Surface Support






























Figure 10: Saturation Diving System Diagram
4.4 Atmospheric Diving Systems (ADS)
The atmospheric diving systems (ADS) or one-man mobile submersibles are to
date the most reliable systems in use [Rawlins and Hawkes, 1985]. This is primarily due
to the fact that decompression sickness and arterial gas embolisms are not a concern. The
most significant safety concerns with this type of diving system are as follows:
1) Hazards of high-pressure leaks at seals,
2) Entanglement or entrapment, and
30
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3) Backup support in the case of an emergency.
The most important redundant system for ADS has proved to be the standby ADS diver
as shown in Figure 1 1
.
Surface Support













Figure 11: Atmospheric Diving System Diagram
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5.0 Accident Data and Analysis
An accident is an undesirable event that may lead to loss of human life, personal
injuries, significant damage to the environment or significant economic loss [Aven,
1992]. A near miss is an undesirable event without loss of life and personal injuries, and
insignificant damage to the environment and insignificant economic loss, but which with
small changes in the situation might have resulted in an accident. In diving operations,
an accident can be further broken down into incident categories as shown in Figure 12
[Bea, 1998 and McSween, 1998]. This figure shows that for every diver fatality, there
are 100 plus lost-time and recordable accidents, and 1,000 plus first aid cases, near
mishaps, and unsafe acts.
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The primary incidents and injuries resulting from diving operations are:
1) Type I decompression sickness (DCS-I) - which refers to skin "bends",
fatigue or pain only (a result of breathing compressed gas).
2) Type II decompression sickness (DCS-II) - which includes neurological and
cardio-respiratory "bend".
3) Arterial gas embolism (A.G.E.) - which represents arterialized gas bubbles
primarily associated with immediate cerebral symptoms. A gas embolism
occurs when a gas bubble causes a blockage of blood supply to the heart,
brain, or other vital tissue.
4) Inert gas narcosis - a state of stupor or unconsciousness caused by breathing
inert gas at pressure.
5) Asphyxia (or suffocation) and drowning - which occurs when the lung is
unable to ventilate.
6) Barotrauma (or squeeze) - which occurs when some air-filled cavities of the
body are not equalized to adjust to pressure change.
7) Carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide poisoning - which are a result of excess
buildup occurs due to exertion and the lung is unable to ventilate.
8) Blowup - lung over-pressurization due to a rapid ascent without expelling air.
[NOAA Diving Manual, 1992]
5.1 DAN Diving Accident Data
Although the Diving Alert Network (DAN) is primarily concerned with
recreational divers, their accident database provides valuable insight into the risk factors
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and contributing causes of diving accidents. An evaluation of 270 accidents from 1987
revealed the common risk factors shown in Table 5 [Bennett, 1990]. Values in the right
three columns indicate the number of times any two factors occurred together:
# ofCases Condition Ascent Fatigue Current
52 A.G.E. Cases Reported
24 Rapid Ascent - 9 8
18 Fatigue 9 - 8
16 Current 8 8 -
14 Buoyancy problem 11 4 3
11 Exertion on dive 7 4 7
47 Type I DCS Cases Reported
22 Current - 12 6
20 Exertion on dive 12 - 11
18 Fatigue 6 1 -
11 Cold 6 7 6
11 Alcohol 8 5 4
171 Type II DCS Cases Reported
73 Current - 28 37
64 Fatigue 28 - 31
58 Exertion on dive 37 31 -
42 Rapid ascent 17 18 20
31 Cold 17 18 22
Table 5: SCUBA Risk Factors
manner:
Dive day conditions and risk factors for Table 5 are listed in the following
1) A strong to moderate current is considered a factor because of increased
exertion.
2) Fatigue is a factor because the diver reported being physically tired or had
missed some sleep the previous night.
3) Exertion is considered because of the increased muscle activity.
4) Cold is a factor because the diver said they were cold or uncomfortable.
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Additional DAN fatality statistics for the 1980s [Bennett, 1990] show that major
contributing factors were as follows: medical disorders (55.7%), environmental factors
(34.8%), and equipment faults (9.5%). Other categories that were likely to contribute to
the accident were inadequate air supply (56%), buoyancy problems (52%), and other
equipment misuse (35%). The air supply (whether low on air or out of air) was a
significant contributory factor as most problems occurred after the low on air situation.
The buoyancy problems consisted of48% negative buoyancy and 8% with positive
buoyancy. Stress and fatigue were found to contribute to 39%, and 28% of the fatalities,
respectively.
5.2 Naval Safety Center Diving Accident Data
From 1954-1996, there have been 79 fatalities and 4,673 incidents in U. S.
military diving units [Naval Safety Center Data, 1996]. Figure 13 shows the breakdown
of incidents by diving system used. Also of note, is the fact that 53% of the incidents
were DCS and 30% were A.G.E.
One significant deficiency with
the database is the lack of total
work-hours or number of dives
conducted, and therefore there is
no accurate way to determine
incident rates.








Figure 13: Diving Incidents by Diving System
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5.3 Oceaneering Diving Incident Data
"Despite years of research and significant scientific advances, decompression
sickness remains a problem and it is not totally preventable" [Youngblood, 1990]. Figure
14 shows overall incident rates for all dives performed by Oceaneering from the years
1983 through 1989. Of note, is the decreasing incident rate by 1989, which in terms of












































Figure 14: Diving Incident Rates, Oceaneering [from Youngblood, 1990]
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5.4 North Sea Diving Incident Data
In a study of diver fatalities in the North Sea from 1971-1977, Table 6 was
developed to quantify failure probability based on the number of fatalities. In this study,
they found that 39% of the 39 deaths reviewed were caused by human factors and that a
fraction of the other deaths could "probably be classified as human errors because of their









No. of fatalities 3 7 2







Table 6: Diver Fatality Rate estimates on the Norwegian Continental Shelf [from
Jacobsen and Stein, 1984]
In the United Kingdom's sector of the North Sea, a survey of all air commercial
dives during 1982-1983, including 25,740 man dives, showed a total of 79 cases of
decompression sickness, 44 Type I (0.17%) and 35 Type II (0.14%) [Bennett, 1990].
This would correspond to a Pf = 1 .7 x 10~
3
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5.5 OSHA Diving Statistics
The United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), only monitors fatalities related to commercial diving.
According to OSHA [1998], an average of 6 to 13 diving-related fatalities occur each
year. With almost 10,000 workers employed as commercial divers, government divers,
and sea harvesters, they face an exceptionally high risk of death and serious physical
harm on the job, corresponding to 28 and 50 deaths per thousand workers over a working
lifetime of 45 years.
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6.0 Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in Diving
Maclnnis [1972] was one of the earlier researchers to assess and evaluate the
various HOF in diving accidents. Figure 1 5 was developed to show "The Diving
Corridor of Effective Performance." Maclnnis showed that performance underwater was











Figure 15: The Diving Corridor, Important Boundaries to Man's Effective
Performance Within the Sea [from Maclnnis, 1972]
In more recent years, Blumenberg [1996] and Cullen [1997] have provided insight
into the fundamental HOF involved in SCUBA operations and underwater welding.
Blumenberg [1996] specifically identified the following HOF influencing SCUBA diving
operations and recommended the use of a Dive Team Human Factor Checklist to assess
the role ofHOF in the dive team:
1
.
Equipment (including tools, adaptation equipment, safety and protective, and
life support).
2. Procedures (rules and regulations for each type of diving system employed).
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3. Environment (pressure, cold, currents, limited visibility - all of which can
change rapidly without warning).
4. Individual diver (dominant factor controlling safety is the diver's physical and
mental fitness).
5. Organization (dominant controllable factor affecting the individual diver).
The organization starts at the dive buddy team, includes the entire dive team,
overall company or military unit, and the diving industry.
6. Interactions or interfaces between the preceding factors (most unpredictable
factor).
Blumenberg [1996] noted two specific controllable areas which should receive the most
m focus; first, "improving individual awareness ofhuman factors and the ability to cope
with stress, and second, improving team coordination, reliability and culture."
In addition, Cullen [1997] recommended that a more in-depth qualitative and
quantitative HOF assessment should be conducted to determine the role ofHOF in diving
incidents. In conducting this assessment, the assumption of positive correlation between
failure modes was suggested to account for the fact that each failure would be the result
of the mistakes of the same diver. The correlation would be a function of stress,
physiological conditions, and the degree of training. It is the author's opinion that this
assumption is correct and, to accurately assess the entire diving operation, correlation
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Based on this assumption, the probability of failure during a diving operation will
be dominated by the maximum probability of failure. Therefore in most situations, the
dominant term of Equation (2) will be the extrinsic human failure. It is this area which
will be given the most focus, since the reliability of the overall system will only be
improved through reduction of the human (diver) error.
6.1 Coarse Qualitative Analysis
Using a reactive risk management approach, taking into account the system safety
concerns and past statistical data provided in sections 2.0 and 3.0, a coarse qualitative
analysis can be performed for each diving system. Based on life-cycle evaluation of
HOF in the diving system (Figure 6 shown earlier), failure to develop adequate safety
will be the primary concern. In addition, since extrinsic causes have been related to 80%
of marine accidents, and the operations phase results in the majority of accidents [Bea,
1998], the risk assessment will focus on the HOF in the diving operation. Cullen [1997]
suggested that incidents could occur in each phase of the diving operation as shown in
Figure 7 earlier.
The diving statistics indicate that decompression sickness (DCS) and arterial gas
embolism (A.G.E.) are the greatest concerns and the result of most incidents. Both of
these incidents would occur in the ascent and decompression phases of the diving
operation. In addition, the statistics also indicate that the loss of air supply should also be
41
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focused on, which again would usually occur during ascent and decompression or at the
end of the bottom operation.
6.2 Detailed Qualitative Analysis
6. 2. J Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
A detailed qualitative analysis can now be performed for each diving system
using the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and the RAC prioritization method
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Identification of
Component








Air Source - Malfunction





Helmet - Malfunction (purge)





Communications - Malfunction III C 4












PTC & DDC - Fire onboard
- Loss of pressure







Bailout Air - Malfunction

















































Table 9: FMEA for Saturation Diving System
Identification of
Component
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- Runs out due to Human error
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A.D.S. Suit - Malfunction (leak in joint)
- Due to poor maintenance (human error)
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Table 10: FMEA for Atmospheric Diving System
From these FMEA's performed for each diving system, a quantitative analysis can
be conducted for the critical failure modes (e.g. failure modes with a RAC of 1, 2, or 3).
In almost every system, the failure modes with a RAC of 1-3 correspond to HOF and loss
of air source. Other failures as a result of lack of maintenance, ship collision, fire, or
exceeding pressure depth limit can also be traced back to human or organizational error.
6.3 Quantitative Analysis
6. 3. 1 Coarse Quantitative Analysis
A complete and comprehensive quantitative analysis would require evaluation of
all critical failure modes in each diving system. This in-depth analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, but by looking at the most common failure modes (loss of air and
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decompression sickness) occurring in the ascent and decompression phase of the
operation, a coarse quantitative evaluation can be performed integrating HOF.
Without remote operated vehicles (ROVs) or at-depth monitoring, the QA/QC
will be relatively low and rely on the dive buddy or standby diver. For this reason,
probability of detection is estimated at 0.25 and the probability of correction is estimated
at 0.5. In addition, performance shapingfactor multipliers (from Table 3) of 1 1 (for
shortage of time) will be applied to the SCUBA system, and 1 .3 (for stress) will be
applied to all estimated generic human error rates (from Figure 4). Since decompression
sickness is not a concern for ADS, no quantitative analysis will be performed.


































Figure 16: SCUBA (Ascent and Decompression)
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Figure 18: Saturation (Ascent and Decompression)
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Applying Equations (2) through (4) as shown in Figures 16 through 18, the
system probabilities can be approximated (based on the dominating extrinsic operation
HOF evaluations and including the undetected and uncorrected QA/QC, [1 - (0.25)(0.5)]
= 0.875). The summed human errors are multiplied by 0.875 to give the P(UE) and then
multiplied by the probability of failure of the system conditional upon the human error




SCUBA: P(Fsi) = 1 E-2 (4. 1 E- 1 ) = 4. 1 E-3
2) Surface Supply: P(FSi ) = 1 E-2 (4.7E-2) = 4.7E-4
3) Saturation: P(FSi ) = 1E-2 (3.6E-2) = 3.6E-4
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7.0 Safety Management Assessment System (SMAS)
Without accurate frequency of event's databases to estimate human error in the
diving industry, a complimentary analysis involving a mixed qualitative and quantitative
approach will be described. Significant research has been conducted in this field of
assessment and management applicable to offshore installations and ships [Bea, 1997],
[Hee, 1997], and [Pickrell, 1997]. This approach known as a Safety Management
Assessment System (SMAS) should be applied to the diving operation.
A Safety Management Assessment System (SMAS) can be applied to the diving
operation to enhance safety and minimize risk. The approach provides a systematic way
of estimating the likelihood of events involving HOF and determining the risk (the
product of the likelihood of failure and the consequences of that failure) [Bea, 1994].
7.1 Concept of SMAS
A Safety Management Assessment System (SMAS) is comprised of three
components: 1) an auditing instrument, 2) an auditing process, and 3) an auditing team
(composition, qualification, and training protocol) [Hee and Bea, 1997]. The primary
focus of SMAS is on the HOF in a system, with emphasis given to the organization.




IRisk Analysis and Management of Diving Operations: Assessing Human Factors
The significance of SMAS, as opposed to other forms of human error checklists
or evaluations, is that it incorporates the system operators [Pickrell, 1997]. Since the
system operators are the most knowledgeable with regards to system safety issues, they
can provide the most accurate and reliable human error database.
7.2 Likelihood Hierarchy
The evaluation process is organized into three levels as shown by Figure 19: 1)
components and interfaces (or modules), 2) factors: detailed areas within the modules
(the malfunction areas listed previously), and 3) attributes [Pickrell, 1997]. Grading
scales with a range of 1 to 7, as previously shown, are used at the factors level. The
assessors provide three grades: 1) most probable estimate, 2) lower bound, and 3) upper
bound (creating a triangular distribution from which a mean can be derived for all
assessors) [Hee and Bea, 1997].
Figure 19: Likelihood Hierarchy
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7.3 Consequence
For a diving operation, three types of consequences that should be addressed are
as follows:
1) Cost (associated with equipment damage),
2) Lost work days, and
3) Injuries/fatalities.
The consequence scales applied to diving operations related to the above categories are
listed in Table 11.
Cost Lost Work Days Inj uries/Fatalities
1 $0
2 $10 1 hour First-aid only required/Near-mishaps
3 $100 1 2 hours Reportable minor injury
4 $1,000 1 day Multiple minor injuries
5 $10,000 1 days Major injury/Lost Time Accidents
6 $100,000 100 days 1 fatality/Multiple major injuries
7 $1 million 1,000 days Multiple fatalities
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7.4 Mathematical Concepts
To capture uncertainty, a "range" scoring method was proposed by Hee [1997]
which requires the assessors to provide three scores for each attribute evaluated. The
scores represent the best, most probable, and worst likelihood or consequence for each
attribute being evaluated [Pickrell, 1997]. Using this concept, the "most probable" score
captures the central tendency of the attribute while the "best" and "worst" scores show
the uncertainty associated with that attribute.
Mathematically, the qualitative scores are translated into quantitative probabilistic
distributions to determine the relative risk of failure. The scores are assumed to represent
a unit triangular distribution with an area equal to one. This concept is illustrated in
Figure 20 where point A represents the "best" score, point B represents the "most
probable", and point C represents the "worst".
Figure 20: Sample Triangular Distribution
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Using the triangular distribution discussed above, the mean and standard
deviation can be derived using Algebra of Normal Functions as shown by Equations (6)
and (7), respectively.
Z =
A + B + C
(6)
(A 2 +B 2 + C 2 -AB-AC-BC)
Continuing with the method of Algebra of Normal Functions, two triangular distributions
can then be multiplied together. Given triangle 1 and triangle 2, their mean and standard



















Equations (6) through (9) form the basis for all computations required by SMAS.
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7.5 A Diving Safety Management Assessment System (DSMAS)
7.5.1 DSMAS Process
The SMAS process as originally developed is based on three phases [Pickrell,
1997]. To modify the process for diving operations, a reactive step is added to phase 3.
This step creates an incident/accident and near-mishap report process, which is fully
integrated into the safety management system as shown in Figure 21 . This phase will
receive the primary focus and require full software implementation to supplement the
current SMAS software developed by Pickrell [1997]. This was performed utilizing the























and Near Mishap Reporting
Figure 21: DSMAS Process Flow Chart [revised from Pickrell, 1997]
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This fully integrated safety management system to assess HOF, a Diving SMAS,
contains the following Diving Operation Modules:
1) Diving Team;
2) Diving Organization;
3) Dive Procedures/SOPs (standard operating procedures);
4) Structural (surface support platforms/pressure vessels);
5) Diving Equipment/systems;
6) Environmental;
Along with the consequence anchoring system discussed earlier, the coarse and
detailed qualitative scoring of risk likelihood for the Diving SMAS factors is provided in




(source: paperwork and interviews)
Detailed Qualitative Scoring
(Specific)
(source: site-visit and interviews)
1 = Best seen in diving industry 1 = Excellent condition
2 = Far exceeds requirements 2 = Good condition
3 = Exceeds requirements 3 = Adequate/good condition
4 = Meets requirements 4 = Adequate condition
5 = Almost meets requirements 5 = Adequate/poor condition
6 = Does not meet requirements 6 = Poor condition
7 = Not available 7 = Extremely poor condition
Table 12: Coarse and Detailed SMAS Scoring
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Using the concepts of SMAS as discussed earlier, the author has adapted the
assessment checklists for diving operations. In addition, based on the author's experience
in Quality Control and Assurance for multi-million dollar construction projects, a 3 -phase




Initial Diving Safety Assessment (Phase 1)
The initial diving safety assessment (phase 1) for the diving team module is
provided in Appendix E. Similar assessment forms are included in the software to
account for the diving organization, the dive standard operating procedures (SOPs),
structural (surface support platforms/pressure vessels), diving equipment/systems, and
environmental factors. This HOF assessment is primarily adapted from SMAS checklists
[Pickrell, 1997] and the Dive Team Human Factors Checklist [Blumenberg, 1996]. Its
main purpose is to obtain an initial assessment ofHOF for the entire diving operation and
identify factors of concern (FOC), which may warrant further evaluation (e.g. categories
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7.5.4 Real-time Diving Safety Assessment (Phase 2)
The real-time diving safety assessment (phase 2) is similar to the initial, but
conducted weekly (or as required) throughout the diving operation to provide continuous
on-site assessment. Areas of concern would require immediate action and may warrant
discontinuing the operation until mitigation or reduction measures are implemented.
Appendix F shows the note-taking sheets for a detailed real-time assessment including all
appropriate diving modules and attributes.
7.5.5 Follow-up Diving Safety Assessment (Phase 3)
The follow-up (phase 3) diving safety assessment contains fields to enter the key
elements to the assessment, the near mishaps, lessons learned, and the incident reporting
which addresses three categories of events and factors [Bea, 1996]:
1
.
Initiating events and factors that may have triggered the incident/accident
sequence,
2. Propagating events and factors that may have allowed the incident/accident
sequence to escalate and result in the accident, and
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Personnel (diving team) directly involved in the incident,
2. Organizations that may have had an influence on the events,
3. Procedures used at the time (formal and informal),
4. Diving Equipment and system used,
5. Structure (surface support platform, pressurized vessels/systems),
6. Environmental conditions, and
7. Interfaces between the preceding categories of factors.
And, would also address the life-cycle characteristics of history of the systems including,
1) design, 2) construction, 3) operation, and 4) maintenance.
Along with the reporting of total hours for the operation, and these key elements,
accurate incident rates and a human error database (based on near-mishaps) can be
developed, which can be used to further analyze the influence ofHOF in diving
operations. The phase 3 data-acquisition sheet is provided as Appendix G. This form is
the basis of data entry and reporting that is fully integrated with the current SMAS
software developed by Pickrell [1997].
J
The implementation of a fully integrated safety management system for diving
operations made use of the recently developed SMAS software and included the phase 3
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follow-up inspection forms and reporting. This type of safety management will provide
an adequate method for assessing risk while providing a simple "user-friendly" system to
track incidents/accidents and near-mishaps. Thus, it will provide a starting point for a
diving HOF error database. In addition, commercial diving operators and military units
will be able to obtain safety information to accurately generate the requisite safety reports
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8.0 Crew Resource Management (CRM) and Team Transition
8.1 CRM Background
Crew resource management (CRM) is a method of training that was originally
developed for the civilian aviation industry and later adapted and applied to military
aviation, hospital emergency rooms, nuclear power plants, and even corporate
management. In its simplest context, CRM is a tool that promotes team reliability
through development of interpersonal skills. Although CRM has received mixed
acceptance over the past two decades, the majority of pilots have endorsed it [Helmreich,
Merritt, and Wilhelm, 1998].
The basic precepts ofCRM are to enhance the overall performance of a man-
machine operation by reducing the frequency and mitigating the consequences ofhuman
errors [Helmreich, and Merritt, 1996]. With this in mind, Helmreich and Merrit [1996]
developed a layered pyramid (the "error troika"), which represents the 3 major goals of
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Figure 22: CRM "Error Troika" [Helmreich and Merritt, 1996]
Although CRM can not eliminate error and assure safety, it is one of an array of
management tools that can be used to manage error [Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm,
1998]. In their most recent research, Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm [1998] have
recommended an error management approach referred to as fifth generation CRM. Error
management at the crew level is defined as:
"Actions taken either to reduce the probability of errors occuring (error
avoidance) or to deal with errors committed either by detecting and correcting
them before they have operational impact (error containment/trapping) or to
contain and reduce the severity of those that become consequential (error
mitigation)" [Helmreich, and Merritt, 1998]
If error is inevitable, then CRM can be viewed as a method of countermeasures with the
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With this approach of error acceptance, new initiatives have been announced by
the Federal Aviation Administration, which actually encourage incident reporting and
near-mishap reporting. This confidential and non-career jeopardizing approach has been
successfully applied by American Airlines who have received nearly six thousand reports
in a two-year period [Helmreich, Merritt, and Wilhelm, 1998]. It is this type of proactive
safety management and data collection, which will allow companies and organizations to
take steps towards minimization and mitigation of recurring incidents.
Since incidents are rare and unique events, incident data can not completely
reveal how the system fails, the human contribution to these failures, and how training
interventions can alleviate and contain them. An alternative but similar approach to
CRM, a "Two-layered Surveillance", has been recently proposed by Maurino [1998] to
assist with this safety concern. The first level includes line/normal simulation audits:
surveys and observations by properly trained assessors/observers utilizing validated tools.
The second level includes monitoring of the normal processes (e.g. communicating,
budgeting, financing, training, monitoring, and allocating resources).
>
Again, this approach requires a consensus that "human error is unavoidable but
manageable". The diving organization must accept that the problem is not with error
itself, but with the consequences [Maurino, 1998]. In this perspective, the diving
organization must also avoid reprimand for errors while maintaining confidentiality, else
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8.2 Team Transition Background
A final concept to enhance safety during diving operations is team transition
training. Team transition refers to a situation that occurs when a team operators are
functioning together for a period of time under routine conditions and then abruptly
confronted abnormal and sometimes emergency circumstances [Huey, and Wickens,
1993]. Although this concept was originally applied to army tank crews, it is gaining
acceptance by nuclear power plant operators, emergency medical service teams, and
maritime ship operators.
During a diving operation, especially one involving mixed-gases and saturation
diving systems, multiple crews may be used to perform a long-duration task. Not only do
these crews deal with the transition arising from emergency procedures, but they also
must face the transition from one crew to another. This is a critical time during the
operation, which will require continual monitoring and assessment from the safety/dive
supervisor.
The team transition study results most applicable to diving operations are
summarized below:
1. "Adequate training and preparation, adapting strategies and tactics appropriate
for the situation, effective leadership, and smooth crew coordination could
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counteract some of the detrimental effects of imposed task demands" [Huey,
andWickens, 1993].
2. Better transition can be accomplished through preplanning, anticipating, and
rehearsing actions to be taken under stress.
3. Special attention should be made to duty schedule, sleep periods, and comfort
of systems being utilized.
4. Teams should maintain their integrity over a period of time. This concept is
especially important to diving operations.
5. Crew composition and selection are vital.
6. While training, repetition and variety are essential.
7. Crisis management and decision-making must be practiced.
8. Problem solving must be trained first in a non-stressed environment first.
9. Fault diagnosis must be taught in complex systems (i.e. mixed-gas surface
supplied and saturation diving systems).
10. Communication is paramount to the success of a mission.
8.3 Diving Risk Reduction through CRM and Team Transition
Risk reduction in diving operations can only be accomplished through a
combination of proactive, real-time (or crisis management), and reactive safety
management information systems and strategies. In each of these approaches, the most
effective safety management can only be accomplished utilizing crew resource
management (CRM) and transition team training as described above. In diving
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operations, the crew (or dive team) is a crucial component to ensure safety. A dive team
is usually 3 or more individuals and can be as large as 20 or more if considering
saturation diving systems, which will include all hyperbaric and topside support
personnel in addition to the divers. As such, the crew must be selected and effectively
trained to handle all incident/accident scenarios that may occur.
This is not an easy task and involves extensive training and repetition of
emergency procedures. Some measures for risk minimization and mitigation of diving
operations using the concepts ofCRM and transition team training are provided:
1. Improved competency and effective training of dive team personnel as a unit.
2. Maintenance of diving equipment program with team involvement.
3. Team evaluation of adequacy and effectiveness of diving procedures.
4. Team auditing and monitoring the Diving Safety Management System.
5. Increased reliability of the overall system by use of simulation or team
training to model the actual operation or specific task to be performed (similar
to NASA underwater training simulations for space repair projects).
6. Implementation of SMAS assessment forms as discussed.
7. Emergency preparedness and crisis management through repetitive simulator
training and team involvement.
8. An acute awareness of the effects of team transition.
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9.0 Computer Implementation and Monitoring
9.1 Computer Implementation of DSMAS
As stated earlier, implementation of a fully integrated safety management system
for diving operations will make use of the recently developed SMAS software and
include the phase 3 follow-up inspection forms and reporting. The current 1997 version
of Microsoft's Access database-managed software will be the computer platform for this
implementation phase. A database-structured approach is crucial to maintaining,
tracking, and monitoring the influences and effects ofHOF error on the overall operation.
The implementation involved four distinct steps:
1) Development of the data acquisition forms shown in Appendices E through H.
2) Development of a monthly summary safety report for each activity (Appendix
I) and development of an input form/report for OSHA (Appendix J).
3) Revision of current data acquisition forms applicable to diving operations, and
4) Software testing utilizing the case study U.S. Navy fatality discussed earlier.
This type of safety management information system will provide an adequate and
accurate method for assessing risk (before, during, and after a diving operation) while
providing a simple "user-friendly" system to track incidents/accidents and near-mishaps.
An organization will be able to use this system to monitor and manage safety proactively
and review factors of concern on a monthly basis. A detailed analysis using PRA or
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HRA techniques discussed earlier can then be developed for any areas or factors of
concern. Steps can then be recommended to correct recurring HOF errors and minimize
the overall risk to personnel.
9.2 Example Diving Accident
Although the DSMAS software is primarily to assess HOF before, during, and
after a diving operation, a U.S. Navy dive accident which resulted in a fatality will be
assessed and entered into the database to verify the accuracy of the software. A summary
of the accident, which was also assessed by Blumenberg [1996], is provided and then
entered into the DSMAS software.
9. 2. 1 Background ofAccident
A U.S. Navy Seabee diver, assigned to Underwater Construction Team One, died
on June 11, 1974 during a cable stabilization project in 100 feet of water. The direct
cause of death was officially arterial gas embolism (A.G.E.) from a rapid ascent
accompanied by breath holding, however, Blumenberg [1996] identified contributing and
compounding factors that may have elevated the situation. These factors will be further
sub-divided into initiating, propagating, and, compounding events to facilitate easy entry
into the DSMAS software database.
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9. 2.
2
Initiating Events and Factors
Diver did not end dive and return to surface before tank pressure reached 500 psi
(formal procedure violated). Both divers failed to abort dive when pressure gages
indicated empty tank. Diver showed evidence of panic during ascent when he grabbed




Propagating Events and Factors
Dive team felt pressure to complete the work quickly because the support vessel
was only available for a short time. Two inexperienced divers were paired as dive-
buddies. Poor coordination of dive team put divers in water prior to having material
resulting, which resulted in more air use. Initial dive brief was not clear to divers. Diver
failed to monitor his air-supply. Buddy used inconsistent hand communications. Buddy
failed to act early and recognize unsafe behavior of diver.
9. 2.
4
Contributing Events and Factors
The diver was a smoker. Diver was relatively new to the team and may have felt
additional pressure from team members. Effects of nitrogen narcosis were unanticipated
even though the diver had complained previous narcosis at similar depths. Diver had
tendency to use air faster than most other divers did (plan assumed both divers would
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work same maximum time). Initial training did not emphasize rescue skill and exhalation
during buddy breathing. Diver was slightly seasick prior to dive. Work was physically
demanding. Diver was using a borrowed regulator which had been adjusted to breath
easier. Buddies did not communicate a change in the dive profile. Dive team culture
condoned exceeding air limits.
9.3 Data Entry with DSMAS
By starting the DSMAS software enclosed (Appendix K), the screen shown in
Figure 23 appears and then minimizes to show the DSMAS main menu (shown in Figure
24).
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Figure 23: DSMAS Intro Screen
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Figure 24: DSMAS Main Menu Screen
From the main menu screen (Figure 24), the initial assessment information is
entered following the SMAS manual contained in Pickrell [1997] and Hee [1997]. The
pre-assessment data is entered first, followed by the phase 1 and phase 2 data. The phase
1 data was entered for the U.S. Navy fatality discussed earlier and a summary report is
included as Appendix F, which can be used to assess areas of concern. The data
acquisition forms are included in the report section of the software. By pressing the
Reports button, Figure 25 will appear prompting for selection of an assessment. If an
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Figure 25: Assessment Selection Screen
The reports main menu (Figure 26) will now appear. Select the Data Acquisition Forms
button.
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Figure 27: Data Acquisition Screen
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The data acquisition form appears (Figure 27). From this form, the user can select
the phase 1
,
phase 2, or phase 3 data acquisitions forms. Select the Phase 3 form to
switch to a print preview of the form (Figure 28). The user can then print the form.
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Figure 29: Phase 3 Data Entry Screen
Close the phase 3 form and return to the main menu. Select Phase 3 data entry to
perform the follow-up safety assessment. Figure 29 will appear. Select the Phase 3
Accident/incident Data Entry button to switch to the input screen (Figure 30).
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Assign an ID number for each accident or incident and enter all necessary data
that was recorded earlier on the phase 3 data acquisition sheet. Multiple incidents can be
entered for each assessed activity. Remember to scroll down to enter all information.
Once all accident information is entered, the user can select the Main Menu button or the
Phase 3 Reports Menu. By selecting the Phase 3 Reports Menu, Figure 31 will appear,
where the user can immediately go to one of the safety reports. Figure 32 shows the
Monthly Summary Safety Report and Figure 33 shows the OSHA Safety Input Report
performed for the U.S. Navy fatality discussed earlier. Appendices I and J show the
output results for that accident.
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Figure 31: Safety Reports Screen
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9.4 Monitoring of Diving Operations
The final question remaining is how can an organization effectively monitor a
diving operation? With today's rapidly growing and diverse array of technological
advancements, the answer may still be a man-machine interface. In this context, the
combination of remotely operated vehicles (ROV) and on-site supervision may provide
the most effective means of evaluating, assessing, and avoiding crisis situations.
As with any project, decision making should be empowered to the lowest level
practicable. However due to the nature and high-risk of the underwater environment, any
additional insight and monitoring from surface support platforms can only enhance the
likelihood of success and minimization ofHOF error. With this concept in mind, the
diving organization must recognize that "human error is inevitable" [Maurino, 1998], yet
understand that error can be minimized and managed to an acceptable level. This can be
accomplished successfully just as it is currently being done in the aviation community
with the proactive use of the fifth generation CRJV1 and the safety assessment tools
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1 0.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
In conclusion, with the continued need for manned-diving operations in the
offshore oil industry and the military, there will continue to be extrinsic risks placed on
divers. This paper has attempted to apply complimentary approaches of Safety
Management and Assessment Systems (SMAS), incident/accident reporting criteria, and
Crew Resource Management (CRM) to develop management tools that assess human and
organizational factors (HOF) in diving operations. In addition, the follow-up assessment
(phase 3) of the diving safety management system was outlined and implemented in
detail, which fully integrates assessment and monitoring of diving operations with
incident/accident reporting legislature.
Through this proactive type of safety management, diving organizations can begin
to create a HOF database that will assist in continued risk analysis and minimization of
manned-diving operations. The database can be used to categorize incidents/accidents
and near-mishaps, and assist with evaluating factors of concern. The sample diving
fatality was successfully entered into the software database (DSMAS) and shows that an
integrated safety management system can be developed and modified to assist an




Risk Analysis and Management of Diving Operations: Assessing Human Factors
Recommendations for continued research dedicated to risk minimization of diving
operations are given below:
1
.
Field verification and modification of the enclosed forms and reports
(generated by the DSMAS software) to meet the missions of the
organizations.
2. Real-time testing of the DSMAS software by military and commercial diving
organizations.
3. Continued efforts to promote safety of manned-diving operations through
proactive Diving Safety Management Systems that are monitored and used for
initial planning, real-time evaluation, and follow-up reporting.
4. Evaluation of risk reduction and minimization of human factors through
alternative underwater systems such as remotely operated vehicles (ROV) and
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Misjudged distance, eleaianee, altitude,speed. etc.
[ ] False perception due to Visual Illusion
Predisposing Conditions:
1. Featureless Terrain (desert.dry lake.water)
2. Dark/Low Visibility
3. Black Hole
4. No/False Horizon (unreliable visual attitude reference)
5. Mountain Terrain/Sloping Runway
6. Rotor Downwash Effects
7. Anomalous Light Effects {eg Flicker Vertigo)
8. Low contrast target/object to background oi poot illumination
9. Looking into bright sun/moon/light, or shadowed area
[ ] False Perception due to Vestibular Illusion
Types:
1. Coriolis




1. Type I: Unrecognized
2. Type II: Recognized (Vertigo)
3. Type III: Incapacitating
Predisposing Conditions:
L Loss of visual cues/attitude reference (especially Horizon)
2. Acceleration induced (g-foroe)
3. Adverse Medical or Physiological condition (aicohol/drug effects, hang >ver/dehydration, fatigue
slate, other)
]
Loss of Situation Awareness
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) APPENDIX B: Diving HOF Checklist
)
DIVE TEAM HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST"
Purpose: The purpose of this checklist is to (1) get an initial "temperature" of the dive

























' Dive supervisor: ....
* Divei «!: ,.
' Pivvi »>.
' Standby diver:
* Tenders for P I :
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) APPENDIX C: U.S. Navy Accident/Incident Information Sheet
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APPENDIX E: Initial Diving Ops Safety Management Assessment (Phase 1)
Assessment of:
Phase 1 INITIAL DIVING OPS Data Acquisition Forms
01 Moduli' Nuni* 1 : Ml • ' :
oi Fictoi Name: Ssa&E) ' ; t 'i
001 Ulnlnili \am: L'"' ,; < '' " »p«C^V
Does the dive platform meet uS sondardj I h current end foreseen nurnbea ofdiven Meet* present
amticipatt I neq ha « nl I
Mm
Best Seen in InJusir.



















01 Module Vain*: n y III '1
02 Factor Name: Ltve Weight Capa
002 Attribute Varnr: ! ;.i,l ! ' ; ^ V yrjci!^
If lining hoist cramsi rulem foi M IS • be .en •v. meet it>? rt> i ;-:: i. m..i ig Meets present /
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APPENDIX F: Sample Phase 1 Module Summary for U.S. Navy Fatality
**» D I V 1 N G Safety Manage m e n I Assess m e n I S y I t e m
Si- -%-.
y' :
'l *£ I'hasc I Module Summary (.riiph (with Ranges)
\#«3^) ,
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APPENDIX G: Phase 2 Detailed Assessment Notes




l.iic Weighi Capw "•
Dead Weight Capacity
Isnvironmental Capacity
Fifo Load 1 apaciij [Passive)
Surface Support Capacity
Diving Equip/Systems
Ai: Tank t tapacil
Cowpressoi Pump Capacity
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APPENDIX H: Follow-up Diving Ops Safety Management Assessment (Phase 3)
Assessment of:
Phase 3 FOLLOW-UP DIVING OPS Data Acquisition Forms/Safety Reporting
1. Accident/Incident: (Direct Cause, eg.
DCS l/lt, AGE., Barotrauma, etc )
2 Near-Mishap Information: (If
Applicable)
3 Lessons Learned:
4 Initiating Events and Factors (that may have tnggerea the incident/accident sequence):
Personnel (dive team) directly involved
Organization that may have influenced events
Procedures used at the time (forma! and
informal)'
Diving equipment/systems used:
Strucure (surface support/pressure vessels/etc)
Environmental Conditions
Interfaces between the preceeding factors







5, Propagating Events and Factors (that may have allowed the incident/accident sequence to
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Assessment of:
Phase 3 FOLLOW-UP DIVING OPS Data Acquisition Forms/Safety Reporting
6. Contributing Events and Factors (that may have encouraged the initiating and propagating






Total time of Operation/Project: (To be completed at the completion of
the project)
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APPENDIX I: Sample Monthly Safety Report (generated from DSMAS)
"
•••,
•"•""». DIVING S a f e t j Manage m l- hi Asset! in e n 1 S \
J^»m* Summary Accident Report






lessons I. earned Practice buddy breathing techniques
Follow set procedures a! low at'
Team-training wit}' actual dive buddies
Initiating Events
Propagating Events
Diver d d nol end diVS and return to surface befoie tank pressure reach
psl (formal procedure Ma/tad) Botn divers failed to abort iflva wtien p
gages indicated empty tank Diver showed evidence of panic during a:
when he grabbed buddies regulator Entanglemont may have caused
i
and the uncontrolled rapis ascent
Dive learn felt pressure to complete the work quickly because the supf
vessel was only available for a short tune Two inexperienced divers v
paired as dive-buddies Poor coordination of dive team put divers in w.
to having material resulting, winch resulted in more air use. Initial dive
was not Clear to divers Diver failed to monitor his air-supp!y Buddy u
Inconsistent hand communications. Buddy failed to act early and reco<
unsafe behavior of diver
Contributing Events ^e a''ver was 3 smoker Diver was relatively new to the team and ma'
leit additional pressure from team members Effects of nitrogen naroo'
unanticipated even though the diver had complained previous narcosis
similar depths. Over had tendency to use air faster than most other di
(plan assumed both divers would work same maximum time) Initial tr;
did not emphasize rescue skiII and exhalation dunng buddy breathing
was slightly seasick pnor to dive Work was physically demanding Di
using a borrowed regulator which had been adjusted to breath easier
did not communicate a change in the dive profile Dive team culturo a
exceeding air limits
02
DCS J (pain only)
Monday. November I ft, l')')H
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Risk Analysis and Management of Diving Operations: Assessing Human Factors
APPENDIX J: Sample OSHA Accident Input Report (generated from DSMAS)
K& __dT. D I V l\(; Safe! y M a n a g c m nil Assess in tnl S y » t e m
ifV OS///* Accident Info
Nc-4,--^
fear CountOfAccident/IncMettt OSHA Classification ofincident/accideni
1974
1 Nen-fteportaWe (DCS-i>
1 Los! Time Accident
! Fatality
1998
1 Kestnr.tK'J A,.! vily
2 NoivRoportable (DCS-I)
1 Non-disabling
2 Lost Tune Accident




Risk Analysis and Management of Diving Operations: Assessing Human Factors
APPENDIX K: DSMAS Disk
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